3 research outputs found
A Critique of Alfred R Meleās Work on Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy
The book, Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy (1995), by Alfred R. Mele, deals primarily with two main concepts, āself-controlā and āindividual autonomy,ā and the relationship between them. The book is divided into two parts: (1) a view of self-control, the self-controlled person, and behaviour manifesting self-control, and (2) a view of personal autonomy, the autonomous person, and autonomous behaviour. Mele (Ibid.) defines self-control as the opposite of the Aristotelian concept of akrasia, or the contrary of akrasia, which implies weakness of will, incontinence, or lack of self-controlāthe state of mind in which one acts against oneās better judgement. According to Mele, the concept of self-control can be approached from two perspectives: (a) how self-control affects human behaviour, and (b) how self-control-associated behavior can enhance our understanding of āpersonal autonomyā and āautonomous behaviourāāpersonal autonomy requires self-control, and autonomous persons and autonomous behaviour are naturally found together. Therefore, I might say that self-control is essential to enhancing oneās autonomy.
In part I, we find an account of self-control where Mele argues that even an ideally self-controlled person might lack autonomy. In part II, Mele gives an explicit account of autonomy and explains what must be added to self-control to achieve autonomy. This is the pivotal claim made by Mele (dismantling the intuitively connected notions of self-control and autonomy)
Freedom of the Will and No-Self in Buddhism
The Buddha, unlike the Upaniį¹£adic or Brahmanical way, has avoided the concept of the self, and it seems to be left with limited conceptual possibilities for free will and moral responsibility. Now, the question is, if the self is crucial for free will, then how can free will be conceptualized in the Buddhist āno-selfā (anattÄ) doctrine. Nevertheless, the Buddha accepts a dynamic notion of cetanÄ (intention/volition), and it explicitly implies that he rejects the ultimate or absolute freedom of the will, but not the minimal power of free will. It seems that the Buddhaās view shifts from agent causation (independent ownership) to a causal sequence of impersonal processes (psychophysical factors). This paper claims to shed clarity on āwhether free will is viable in the context of the anattÄvÄda in Buddhism.ā It mainly studies the secondary sources (even though it has also discussed the primary sources) and their interpretations of freedom of the will and how it further does argue for a compatibility approach of free will in Buddhist thought